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Abstract: Indebtedness as a global phenomenon has attracted much attention both in public discourses 
and in academia in recent years. In Hungary, however, up to date social scientists have not paid 
considerable interest to studying debt. Drawing on long-term ethnographic fieldwork in rural northern 
Hungary, in this article I explore the financial portfolios of the poor in two settlements and their debt 
relations. I attempt to show how different forms of debt (formal and informal) are used, perceived, and 
valued; what kinds of different meanings are attached to them; and how they interrelate to each other. 
I will show the magisterial juggling of the poor with income scarcity, and the wizardry with which they 
make a living on twenty-two thousand forint (60 $) a month, the Hungarian equivalent of the “$2 a 
day” global poverty benchmark. I will attempt to shed light on the role of informal moneylending in 
this puzzling story. I will explore how the cash-poor invent new ways (by appropriating and adjusting 
established ones; among others, subprime lending) to generate regular income. Whilst comparing the 
practices of formal and informal financial institutions towards the poor, I argue that informal/‘illegal’ 
lenders fill the gap, the economic niche, left empty by formal/legal financial companies, to “bank the 
unbanked”. Through this process, however, old dependency structures are reconfigured, new patron-
client ties are formed and community wealth is redistributed – to further impair the poorest of the poor. 
Keywords: debt relations, scarcity, poverty, informal money lending, subprime lending, patron - client ties
Introduction
“If you are short on money, you draw on whatever you can - you just agree on anything,” 
says Iza when I try to figure out why and how on earth she decided to sign a loan 
agreement of one hundred and fifty thousand forint (5.000 $) with Evident, (one of the 
most commercially aggressive private banks in Hungary, both in terms of finding clients 
1 I am grateful to the families in Lapos and in Bánya who shared their everyday life with me in the last couple of years and let me 
have an insight even into their personal businesses: their financial portfolios and their lending and borrowing practices. I also 
owe a debt of thanks to my informal moneylender interviewees who have trusted me and shared with me their narratives about 
their businesses. I thank György Molnár and Mónika Váradi for their valuable comments on the first draft of this paper along 
with Gergő Pulay for drawing my attention on to some important literature from the discipline of economics and economic 
anthropology. I am also grateful to Emily Barroso for her editing work I dedicate this paper to Iza and to Rozika from whom I 
learnt an awful lot about how to juggle with money and how to make a living on “$2 a day”, or on 22.800 forint a month. 
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and enforcing payments).2 The 35-year-old Iza lives in Bánya, a former mining town, 
and has a one-year-old baby for whom she is entitled to thirty nine thousand forint (130 
$) childcare allowance monthly. Her long unemployed ‘man’ (co-habiting partner) is on 
welfare, bringing only twenty-two thousand and eight hundred (forint) home in a month. 
Out of this fifty-one thousand and eight hundred (forint) regular monthly income for 
her family of three, Iza must repay her debt to one of her old neighbours, Aunt Mary, an 
informal moneylender from whom she requested 50.000 forint (HUF, equivalent to cc 
$170) when her baby became seriously ill; the deal was to pay back 100.000 on ‘payday’ 
(with a hundred per cent interest rate); the grocery shopkeeper, from whom she bought 
the meat on credit (30.000 HUF) during the last month when they didn’t have money 
for food; and the Missy from the Post Office who lent her 5.000 forint in the hope that 
Iza would buy meat from her at her pig killing the following month. Henceforth, on top 
of all these debts, for at least two years she would need to hand over the weekly 5.000 
forint instalment to the village nurse, who is at the same time Evident’s local agent, and 
regularly comes to visit her sickish, fragile but beautiful baby: Iza’s ‘only happiness in life’ 
as she sometimes puts it. “This is too much, do you believe it?” said Iza the other day, “It’s 
just a lot [to handle]. But I did have to do it [get the Evident loan]. Erzsike [the nurse] was 
the only one who helped me. Who else would lend me any money any more, for what? 
They all know I have nothing to repay it from.” 
Iza desperately needed money to sort out the housing problem of her grown up 
daughter, the 19-year old Kiara and her family. Kiara, with her two toddlers and partner 
moved to be nearer Iza from her village, Lapos, after a fight with her grandmother who 
had provided her with a room for the last three years since she had her first baby at 
the age of sixteen. Iza was torn apart by her ambivalent feelings: she naturally wanted 
to help her daughter, but at the same time, she could not bear the tension of living 
overcrowded, six in a one-room shack. After a month in which she lived on Frontien (a 
sedative drug), she feverishly started to look for a solution in which to get Kiara and 
her family their own accommodation in her neighbourhood. The only possibility she 
managed to get hold of was to buy a rundown shack whose owner was in desperate need 
of cash and therefore agreed to sell the house at a price that was considerably less than 
the market rat e and under the proviso of a sort of (informal) hire purchase. The nurse, 
Evident’s contracted agent, posed as a saviour and delivered home the 150.000 forint 
bank loan (for an additional cost and on the pledge of her shack and appliances: colour 
TV and refrigerator). The deposit was paid; Kiara and Iza agreed that they would pool 
their money and settle the monthly instalments together from their child allowances, 
and the deal was done on the same day. Iza was relieved – only to realize what trouble 
she had put herself into when a month later, Kiara’s husband decided to move back to 
Lapos with his family, as he could not get used to living in Bánya. He missed his village, 
his extended family with its all kind of resources; he convinced Kiara to take the kids 
2 All names of persons, settlements and institutions are fictional, due to the sensitivity of the subject matter and in line with the 
requests of my interlocutors’/co-workers’ during my ethnographic fieldwork.
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and go back to Mama.3 They left Iza to deal with the empty, newly hire purchased shack 
and her debt. 
This story might be seen by some of the readers of this paper as one that further 
fuels the already deeply held stereotypical beliefs concerning how unwisely, 
irrationally, and unskilfully the poor manage their finances. However, as we will 
see later in the text when I attempt to analyse and interpret Iza’s and the other local 
poor’s hire purchase schemes and other informal lending and borrowing practices 
as well as financial portfolios (Collins et al. 2009), we will understand that Iza is 
one of the many poor who masterfully juggle with income scarcity, and whom have 
developed a ‘wizardry’ of making a living on benefit, around 22.800 forint (60 $) 
a month, the Hungarian equivalent of the “$2 a day” global poverty benchmark, 
during the last twenty years of her (formal) unemployment. 
Popular discourse that seems to have established itself as common wisdom 
in Hungary, remarks upon the poor’s financial incapability and the lack of their 
financial education as a reason for their chronic indebtedness. Many professional 
civil experts in Hungary are convinced that the cash-strapped poor borrow over 
their means because of their myopia, and due to their present-oriented habitus.
There also seems to be a consensus both in academic and public discourse 
in Hungary, that the biggest losers and victims of the country’s transition from 
socialism to a market economy are the Roma (Kemény – Janky 2003, Ladányi – 
Szelényi 2005; Kertesi 2005; Köllő 2009; Messing – Molnár 2011; Szalai 2002; Virág 
2006, just to list some). Statistical data demonstrates how over-represented Roma 
are among the poor and the unemployed (Ladányi – Szelényi 2005; Kertesi 2005; 
Gábos et al. 2015) – and Iza is one of them. The fact, that almost three-quarters of the 
Hungarian Roma population live in severe deprivation, comparing to the 24 per cent 
of the total population (Gabos at al. 2015), helps the anti-Gypsiist, discriminatory, 
exclusionary social milieu (led by the far right political party) in contemporary 
Hungary scapegoat the Roma, by inventing the category of the ‘Gypsy problem’ 
as the source and cause of all entire predicament (poverty, usury, petty crimes) of 
present day Hungarian society (Feischmidt – Szombati 2013; Vidra 2014). In the 
last decade, poverty and usury (which I prefer to refer to in this paper as informal 
moneylending) have become highly ethnicised in public discourse and accordingly, 
in the perception of lay people. The demonised, ethnicised and condemned figure of 
the Usurer is almost always depicted as a Gypsy man and can be found frequently in 
the Hungarian media. 
Public intellectuals and civil workers, committed to helping the poor, in their 
efforts to avoid ‘blaming the victims’, emphasize the structural (economic, social 
and political) forces of society that create and reproduce poverty. Nevertheless, they 
3 Kiara’s grandmother
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also see the poor as passive victims when explaining the reasons of their reproducing 
poverty (Ritók 2011). 
There are a few scholars and political activists who have recently advocated a 
new discourse about the Roma which is empowering rather than “victimizing” (Bíró 
et al. 2013). They get harsh criticism in a social context given public intellectuals 
and academics frequently speak about ‘learned helplessness’ (tanult tehetetlenség) 
as the common characteristics of the poor. According to some NGO leaders, this 
feature of the poor, among other things, hinders civil institutions to effectively 
help low-income families improve their economic circumstances (Ritók 2011). In 
the centre of this line of argument lies the conviction that the poor suffer from 
learned helplessness: a condition discovered and analysed by psychologist Seligman 
(1975) in which people do not try to get out of a negative situation (be it poverty or 
depression) because the past has taught them that they are helpless. As Ritók (2011), 
the founder-leader of one of the most successful Hungarian NGOs, committed to 
supporting families living in chronic and deep poverty in rural Hungary, put it: “This 
is a pertinent expression, referring rightly to those who are expecting others to do 
something for them, to sort out their difficulties.” (ibid.)
In this paper I aim to demonstrate that at a grass root level, contrary to ‘common 
wisdom’ in Hungary, the seemingly hopeless  situation of the poor cries for more complex 
explanation than their 'learned helplessness'. Many of them, indeed, Roma and non-
Roma families demonstrate every single day how actively they try to make their living (see 
also Messing – Molnár 2011; Collins et al. 2009; Venkatesh 2006; Pulay 2015) instead of 
passively expecting help to come from outside. Some of the poor can only imagine future 
and economic betterment through geographical mobility (Durst 2013; Vidra – Virág 
2013; Pine 2014), but others still keep trying to make a living in their hometown. For 
many of them it means inventing a survival strategy in the informal /‘illegal’ economy 
(the denomination depends on the current legislation, see Durst 2011) in a social context, 
where there is vast ethnic discrimination on the labour market (Kertesi 2005) and a “war 
on the poor” (Jeppesen 2009; see also Ferge 2014 and Szikra 2014 on the punitive state in 
Hungary) - contributing factors that drive them into informality. 
One of the lessons learnt from the analysis of economic practises of the informal 
moneylenders in rural Hungary is that even those poor whose “decision-making 
capacities are restricted by their limited assets, be it in terms of wealth or power 
are nevertheless capable of developing sometimes complex individual strategies 
to enhance their own well-being” (Narotzky  – Besnier 2014; see also Collins at al. 
2009) and facilitate their children’s social advancement. 
Debt relations and financial portfolios of the poor
To date, in Hungary, most research on the economy of the poor is concentrated almost 
exclusively on their ‘subsistence strategies’ (megélhetési stratégiák) (Havas 1998; 
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Szuhay 1999; Fleck et al. 2000; Messing – Molnár 2011; Kotics 2012). The poor’s 
financial portfolio management in general and their debt relations in particular, 
have not yet attracted ethnographic attention from scholars in Hungary. (See for 
exception Gosztonyi 2015 or Durst 2015). 
On the contrary, in other parts of the word, mainly in the ‘Global South’ there is 
a growing body of scholarship on debt and on the lending and borrowing practices 
of the poor. This academic literature has common observations despite the spacial 
particularities of their studied communities. Namely, that the financial practices of 
the poor can best be described as having sophisticated, complex and diverse portfolios; 
skilfully juggling a cash-strapped lifestyle characterised by instability and incalculability 
of incomes (Bouman 1990; Collins et al. 2009; for Hungary see Gosztonyi 2015).
Anthropological work on debt also shows how misleading the definition found 
in economic textbooks is, according to which debt is a monetary transfer between 
two parties considered equal. On the contrary, these studies, suggest that debt has 
no universal meaning but rather a variety of meanings and formulations within 
particular contexts (Guerin 2014; Pebbles 2010; Hann – Hart 2011). The history 
of debt, they argue, shows that debt is both shaped by and constitutive of social 
relations, moral values and culture (Pebbles 2010; Graeber 2011), and that debt 
occurs within dependency chains that extend far beyond monetary repayments 
(Guerin 2014). Our work here echoes this anthropological strand of literature. 
There is not much representative statistical data in Hungary on the poor’s chronic 
indebtedness. What we know is that one fifth of the Hungarian population live in 
severe deprivation, and that three quarters of all Hungarians would be unable to 
cover unexpected expenditures (Gábos et al. 2015). We also know that one of the 
biggest problems of present Hungarian society is ‘housing poverty’: in 2014, almost 
one forth (24,9 %) of the total population had some kind of housing debt, that is 
deferred loan instalments, utility bills and rent arrears unpaid debt in deferred 
utility bills and rent arrears (Habitat 2014: 20). 
  Although, over the past decade, the idea that poor households in desperate 
need of cash are ‘bankable’ has been widely embraced in developing countries (Collins 
et al. 2009) in Hungary only a couple of financial or social agents have entered this 
market. Very few of them did it on a non-profit basis, to enhance social enterprise in 
order to help the poor to sustain themselves by creating their own small businesses 
(e.g. the so called ‘Kiút program’, a microcredit program granted by private donors, 
see Molnár et al. 2014; or some of the NGO, Autonomia’s previous projects). However, 
very few formal and much more informal lenders stepped into this market as they 
realized that the poor can be a good asset; that is, banking those who were believed 
to be ‘unbankable’ by formal, conservative credit providing institutions, can be a 
profitable enterprise. As we will see shortly, among these agents, Evident, the local 
saving banks (Takarékszövetkezet), the hire purchase telephone companies, and last 
but not least, the pawn shops are leading the formal financial markets for poor 
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clients in northern Hungary. Regarding informal lending, the main agents here are 
the moneylenders (‘kamatosok’ as they are called in rural Hungary) who give loans 
to the poor at high interest rates, from 30 to 100 per cent; the petty local monarchs 
(mainly the local mayors); and neighbours, friends and families who help them out 
in emergency situations, but only on rare occasions. Part of the lessons learnt in 
the Hungarian instance, as we will soon see, are in accordance with other studies 
on the poor in developing countries: they keep diverse, complex and sophisticated 
financial portfolios as they need instruments for managing their lives that are full 
of instability and uncertainty and for buffering against shocks (Collins et al. 2009). 
But the Hungarian lessons also shed light on something that is easily overlooked; 
namely, that the poor themselves, by appropriating the practices of formal financial 
institutions and by learning from their predecessor informal lenders (see Goddard's 
[2005] review on the history of usury), can fill the gap, left almost empty by state and 
private banks and companies: they bank the unbanked, and by doing so, enhance their 
own social mobility. This happens in circumstances when the welfare state diminishes 
and its only function remains its punitive character against the poor (Szikra 2015).  
One of my intentions in this paper is to highlight the different values surrounding 
debt in order to shed light on the particular characteristics of the indebtedness 
of the Hungarian poor. While debt can be considered to be good as to the ends it 
meets, such as when it is used for investment, development or when it functions as 
a hope (Guerin 2014), as regards the poor in the studied communities, ‘bad debt’ is 
prevailing, as it is almost exclusively used for alleviating their everyday crises, and 
leads to their subjugation and dependency on their creditors. 
The research context 
Conducting research on the lending and borrowing practices of the poor and aiming 
to explore the general logic and principles of the (formal and informal) institutions 
involved in these financial acts, it proved necessary not only to talk to employees 
and contracted agents from the financial companies in this market, but to engage 
in more than one community or network. After my long-term ethnographic 
engagement in Lapos, one of the numerous segregated settlements in the country, I 
found it particularly useful, for the purpose of this paper, to expand my investigation 
into Bánya, a small, former mining town in the same region in North Hungary, 
Borsod with its greater facilities for work opportunities and for utilising the formal 
financial sector. Beyond ethnographic fieldwork, I also conducted semi-structured 
interviews with 40 informal moneylenders who, despite the particularly sensitive 
topic, due to the recently introduced Usury Act 4 in Hungary, were willing to speak to 
4 In 2011 the Hungarian government introduced a Usury Act. This was a tightening of the previous criminal law. By this new 
legislation, ‘zero tolerance’ was declared towards usury (which I rather call informal moneylending in this paper). Since then 
even first time offenders can face imprisonment.
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me about their business. I use these interviews to explore and analyse the meanings 
the moneylenders attach to their practise; how they construct their lender-identity 
and how they rationalise it, and what moral grounds (if any) they base their practise 
on. Analysing the common principles and logic of informal moneylending, I will 
also use ethnographic findings gained on occasions when I accompanied my debtor 
informants from the two settlements on repay their debts to their creditors. 
Let us turn our attention now to the local communities analysed in order to describe 
the situation of the poor and their financial circumstances to better understand how 
they manage to cope with their income poverty and how they juggle with their money. 
Lapos is a small, kinship-related village in Borsod, one the most economically 
disadvantaged regions in North Hungary. During the last two decades it has turned 
from being a prosperous small rural settlement to a ‘Gypsy village’, or ‘Shanty 
village’ [putrifalu in Hungarian] as the locals call it, with 750 inhabitants and a 
total of three ‘ethnic Hungarian’ nuclear families.5 All Gypsy men and women of 
working age are long-term unemployed, most of them since the end of the 1980’s; 
the beginning of the transition from state socialism to market economy when most 
of the manufacturing factories and mines of the region were closed down, sacking 
first their low-educated, unskilled Gypsy workers. This is the kind of settlement that 
Wilson (1999) described as the “ghetto of the unemployed”. This ghettoization was 
a relatively gradual development which received its final push by the out-migration 
of the ‘Hungarians’ (magyarok) through the dissolution of the old Gypsy settlement 
whose unintended consequences were the complete segregation and closing up of the 
local communities with minimal social and economic interaction to the surrounding 
world (Durst 2010).
Before the outmigration of the “peasants” (or as they are called today by the local 
Gypsies: the ‘Hungarians’ (magyarok), the economic life of the village had multiple 
participants and it was based on long-established patron-client relations between 
peasants and ‘their Gypsies’ (Havas 1998; Fleck et al. 2000; Virág 2010; Horváth 
2012; Kovai 2015; Szuhay 2012). This social organisation gave way recently to debt 
relations as I have explored elsewhere (Durst 2015) and as it is observed in some 
other neighbouring countries (Hrustic 2015). However, as we will soon see, and as it 
is described in other parts of the developing world (Guerin 2014), debt became a tool 
for the reconfiguration of forms of dependence, especially of patronage ties (Platteau 
1995), with informal moneylenders (kamatosok) and local petty monarchs (mayors) 
becoming the new patrons/creditors of those stuck in poverty.
Nowadays the economic life of the Laposians is driven by three mayors agencies: 
the new patrons, that is, the mayor as the head of the local government and the 
5 Throughout the whole paper I use the denomination and self-ascription of the members of the studied communities. When 
referring to people’s ethnic belonging, I employ the terminology used by them. People who would be called in politically 
correct terms Roma refer themselves as Gypsy (cigány) in this region, and everybody else – that is, non-Gypsies (gadzso or 
paraszt (peasants) as Hungarian (magyar). The distinction between the categories ‘Gypsy’ (cigány) and ‘Hungarian’ (magyar) 
has been and recently is growing to be one of the main rules governing interaction in local rural societies in Hungary (Horváth 
2012; Kovai 2015).
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‘boss’ of public work, and the informal moneylenders on one side, representing 
those in power - and the poor Gypsies, the old clients transformed into new debtors, 
on the other side of the local hierarchy. The poor Gypsy community still preserves 
some parts of its old norms, amongst others, the value of reciprocity (at least in 
ideology) that meshes poor communities together and enables them to survive in 
circumstances of poverty (Stack 2013; Stewart 1994) as I have previously explored 
elsewhere (Durst 2015).6 However, in an era of financialisation (Martin  2002), and 
the wealth accumulation of newly emerging informal moneylenders, reciprocity 
has been transformed into hierarchical relations.7 The transformation is hidden for 
those at the bottom of the hierarchy as moneylending is seen by both the debtor 
and creditor as an act of “helping”, being integrated in the language of favour and 
solidarity (see also Palomera’s [2014] case of Dominican migrants in Barcelona). Not 
only in Lapos but also in Bánya and other surrounding settlements, debtors talk 
about their creditors as “helpers”. Rozika put it this way when she spoke to me about 
Zolika, one of the village’s chief informal lenders: ”He is a good-hearted man. He 
helps you out when they [the company] want to switch off your electricity, or they 
want to take you to prison ‘cos you can’t pay [your penalties or arrears]”.
The formally unemployed Laposians economic practices are mostly organised 
around public and seasonal/ occasional or informal work, their only sources of their 
mostly irregular income. What is regular is the “women’s money” as they call it here: 
the childcare allowances. And for those who are judged “undeserving” by the village 
mayor, the allocator of the public work, there is another regular income, that is, 
the social benefit, which was recently reduced to 22.800 forint and was entitled 
only to one member of a family – the amount which became, in public discourse the 
Hungarian equivalent of the “$2 a day” global poverty benchmark (Collins et al. 2009). 
As to informal work, the unemployed villagers are busily engaged in scrap metal 
collecting, mushroom- and different herb picking (from spring till late autumn) and 
some of them are into informal moneylending – activities that are either penalised 
or fined or in the process of being taxed by the current Hungarian government. All 
recent changes in social and public policy are pointing in one direction: there is a 
“war on the poor”, and an even harsher one on the “poor Gypsies”, by blaming the 
victims for not being willing to work. (See also Ferge [2014] on the punitive state or 
Szikra [2015] on the current Hungarian government’s social policy). 
For long-term unemployed villagers, public work is almost only legal opportunity 
and hope for economic betterment. Being a public worker is a privilege because it 
yields twice as high monthly income than social benefit. However, it is also a vehicle 
6 Isa put it this way once what reciprocity, the mutual obligation of help means nowadays in these communities: “Before it 
worked well; you can remember when we had to pull our money together to Mama’s funeral, those [kin] who could afford 
it, gave more money into the cost, to help those who had less money. But even this is changed these days. Think of Mari; she 
helps me occasionally look after my child. In return, she expects me to repay it double: either by buying her a pack of coffee 
or a box of cigarette”. 
7 I use the term ‘hierarchy’, following Graeber, as a relation between parties where one is (or believes to be) socially superior 
(Graeber 2010: 6)
Review of Sociology, 2015/438
to reconfigure dependency ties and to build new hierarchies (but it is still only 
three quarter of the minimum wage) between villagers and their ‘boss,’ the local 
mayor.8 In the last few years, since the launch of the public employment program, 
local state agents are among the very few who can provide social security and secure 
livelihoods (through public work), but only many times the basis of ‘deservingness’ 
(Váradi 2004; Thelen et al. 2008) – for those who are loyal to them (voted for them 
in the recent elections). However, it is worth noting, that due to decentralisation, 
large variations exist in the ways the public employment programme is implemented 
locally by any particular settlements' leader (Asztalos Morell 2014; Schwarz – Szőke 
2014; Szőke 2015; Váradi 2015). But what is important for our subject here is that 
the program gives the public worker an ‘employment status’ with a regular monthly 
income, which can serve as collateral for some formal - bank and local cooperative’s - 
loans and for the mayor's informal credit to help out his loyal clienteles. It also serves 
as a pledge that contracted bailiffs can withdraw the banks unpaid debts from. 
The Gypsies of Bánya, as opposed to Lapos, have possibilities other than public 
work. Partly thanks to the better settlement status of this place, a former mining town, 
with more developed infrastructure than villages usually have in Hungary, and within 
close proximity of two bigger cities in the region, Bányaians are in a better position to 
have their non-Gypsy Hungarian neighbours and to take up formal employment in 
the nearby multinational company. Also, through the help of their more heterogenous 
(networks) networks, some men with vocational training manage from time to time 
to find occasional, menial work abroad. Still, three quarters of the local Gypsies have 
debts amounting to more than their monthly income. 
I use Bánya as a case not only to explore the general logic and common features 
of informal moneylending in this region but also to explore the lending practices 
of the private bank, Evident – almost the only one in this region that specialised 
albeit clandestinely in “banking the unbanked”; lending to the poor with low 
regular incomes on the pledge of their rundown shacks. Evident doesn’t have any 
contracted agents in Lapos, but they have two in Bánya, both are local nurses in 
their primary jobs. I suspect, even the bank finds Lapos a “hopeless” community in 
the sense that they do not expect to make profits there by selling their loans to the 
local unemployed who do not even own their shelters. In Lapos, the bank has only 
one client, Pimis, who learnt about this borrowing opportunity from her relatives 
living in a bigger town. Pimis needed Evident’s loan (of 150.000 forint) to start up 
her informal moneylending business in Lapos a year ago. 
Evident is very active in Bánya, however. Every other family in the Gypsy colony 
8 The recent case of the local nursery having lost its teachers is a good example of the local dependence between the mayor and 
his clients. The mayor ordered four of ‘his’ public worker women to take up the job of the teachers who left during the summer 
holiday, until he doesn’t find adequate substitutes for them. Despite the public workers’ cries that they have no qualifications 
for this job given they have only 8 grades of schooling and despite the local Gypsy parents’ complaints against the situation, 
there was no choice. The mayor threatened the public workers that he would fire them (which means they will not be eligible 
for social benefit for a year), and also warned the complaining parents that if they did not send their children to the nursery, 
they would lose their childcare benefit (which is attached to school going children).
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is or used to be the bank’s client - many still suffer from unrecovered debt which 
is nowadays transferred into the hands of the infamous bailiff of the region who 
is Evident’s contracted partner for collecting its unpaid loans by withdrawing each 
month one third of its debtors’ social grant or their public work salary from their 
bank accounts.
Why the poor need loans: the demand side  
The biggest items in the budget of the poor are food and utility expenses, both in 
Bánya and in Lapos. One of the unintended consequences of the Gypsy Colony 
Dissolution Program (telepfelszámolás) in Lapos was the vast indebtedness of the 
locals – there is not a single family who did not have debt. Most of them used to 
have low utility expenses (they paid only for electricity) living in their shacks on 
the colony. By moving them into the peasants’ self-contained (összkomfortos) houses 
already in need of renovation, they found themselves with mounting deferred utility 
bills that they had no extra sources to settle with. 
Another factor of the massive indebtedness of the poor in these two settlements 
can be attributed to changes in social policy. Dismantling the welfare character of 
the state (by radically curbing social provisions) and expanding its punitive features 
had another detrimental consequence of the poor. Due to the “war on the poor” 
(Jeppesen 2009), or more precisely, the “war on the Gypsy poor” (Setét 2014), there 
is almost no family in Lapos, and in the Gypsy colony in Bánya, in which somebody 
was not fined during the last three years. The majority of them received a penalty 
charge for collecting wood from the forest during the cold wintry months. 9 Some 
were fined for their children’s unauthorised absences from school. 10 Others were 
penalised by the police for “not walking on the right side of the road.” One Gypsy 
man was punished with a 20.000 forint penalty charge for driving a car with an 
“illegible number plate” (that is, the policeman found the number plate dirty; it 
apparently did not allow him to read the numbers to identify the car). 
No wonder every family in Lapos has unpaid debt. Almost all of them earmark 
their money on paydays. First they try to settle the pressing debts: electricity bills in 
the fear that the utility company would switch off their lights; and penalty charges, in 
instalments to avoid the men doing their time in exchange for securing payments.11 
The way Jucus, a mother with six children husbands the family’s monthly budget 
illuminates the shared predicament of the Laposian Gypsies in recent years. Jucus 
took two purchase loans, the sum of 150.000 forint each from the local Cooperative, 
9 Jézuska recalls his last encounter with the police this way: “I told the policeman, “listen, do you want me to get frozen?! Or 
what do you want?! How shall I get the wood for my family if not from the forest? I would buy it, believe me, if I’d have work. 
But I don’t. The police said if I don’t pay the fine, I can do my time. In the end, they let me pay my fine in instalments, luckily”.
10 A mother and a father of eight children had to do their time for three years, leaving behind four minor kids to the care of one 
of their grown up ones. Their only sin was to fail to pay the fine for their children’s missing school.
11 According to current legislation, one day spent in prison equals 3000 forint penalty charge.
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for a thirty per cent interest rate, using her husband’s public work income as collateral, 
and providing two guarantors for each loan to secure the repayment. A guarantor 
can only be someone with regular income, that is, only the few old pensioners of the 
village qualified for this role. Due to the short supply of these persons, borrowers 
have to pay a lot to those who are willing to take the high risk of guaranteeing a 
loan. Whereas a guarantor’s fee was five thousand forint three years ago, nowadays 
it has amounted to fifteen thousand forints as most of the potential guarantors have 
either passed away or have already pledged for the debtors payment defaults.12 
Jucus needed the Cooperative’s purchase loan (A-hitel) to buy furniture for 
her new house 13, as her previous shelter, the shack in the colony, was three times 
smaller than this new one. After paying the four guarantors and the transaction 
fee to the Cooperative, she had 220.000 forint left (out of the 300.000 loan). In 
return, she had to repay 25.000 forint monthly instalments for two years, which 
is one fifth of the family’s income. Jucus, since I’ve known her, keeps having her 
mind bent on calculating how to manage her unmanageable finances – by the tenth 
day of the month, after she repays her debts or deferred bills, she has hardly any 
money left to feed her family. This is how she summarises her constant struggle to 
cover the gap between her expenses and incomes: “On payday, out of the 130.000 
forint [coming from her childcare allowance and her husband’s social benefit as 
he is no longer employed on public work], 20.000 goes straight on to Zolika [the 
moneylender], 15.000 for the deferred electricity bill, 5.000 for the fine for wood 
[‘illegal’ collecting]. Then they withdraw the 25.000 OTP [the Cooperative’s] loan. I 
might not pay the electricity bill this month. I might just get it switched off. I only 
have the lights and the TV left. I already cancelled my water, as I had huge arrears 
[from unpaid bills to the utility company]. I’d rather bring the water from the well, 
as this is free. Then my young boy [inas] needs 5.000 for school [for snacks], not to 
mention that he doesn’t have a coat or shoes. He is thirteen, he goes to Grade 6, and 
I’ll get fined if he drops out of school. I hardly sleep. I keep calculating (gógyizok). My 
brain doesn’t stop working out how to divide this little money. You see, however I 
distribute it, it doesn’t last for the month. It would do if we didn’t have debts, then I 
could husband it. But we are indebted. I have to turn to the moneylender (belenyúlok 
a kamatos pénzbe) if there is nothing else”. 
Nevertheless, for the poor, like Jucus, turning to informal moneylenders is 
only the last resort. Before using this final possible source of “help” they try other, 
(seemingly) cheaper opportunities to alleviate their chronic need of cash.
12 One local man just got an official letter a few days ago from the bailiff about a 2 million forint debt, pledged on his house, for 
his guarantee’s cumulative deferred non-payment.
13 She had to sell some of this new furniture half price some month later when she had to manage a crisis situation and 
desperately needed cash to take one of her children to hospital
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Banking the unbanked: the supply side
The main agents on the formal financial lending market are the district saving 
Cooperative (Takarékszövetkezet), the Pawn houses, Evident, a foreign private bank 
with branches in Hungary and the so-called hire purchase companies. 
During late socialism, when almost all people of working age were employed, all 
the Laposian low-income families (Gypsies and non-Gypsies) applied for consumer 
loans from the local Cooperative. During socialism the collateral for their loans was 
their regular monthly income as wage labourers. Then, from 1989 onwards, with the 
transition to a market economy, in less than a year all the Gypsies from the village 
became (and to date, remained) unemployed. As such, they were not credit worthy 
any more. 
After a while, the local saving bank has realised that if there are no Gypsy clients, 
there is no business. (By this time, the young or middle aged, highly educated non-
Gypsy population has migrated out of this region to the economically more developed 
parts of the country, leaving behind only the old aged, pensioner ‘peasants’; the very 
few ‘ethnic Hungarian’ intellectual elites (teachers, doctors, mayors, etc.) - and the 
unemployed, poor Gypsies. 
Therefore, to recover the local Cooperative’s main business profile, they launched 
a new small purchase loan scheme (A-hitel), and they designed the application 
criteria around the need of the unemployed Gypsies. The only precondition of being 
eligible for a small consumer loan, apart from learning to write down their names, 
was to open a bank account at the Cooperative where all the social provisions were 
transferred. In this way the social grants (benefits and childcare allowance) became 
the collateral of the loan. In addition to it, the institution of guarantors was meant 
to secure repayment. As one of the employees of the Cooperative said to me that 
time, “With this special credit scheme, we managed to regain our clientele. Gypsies 
used to contract many loans but then unemployment came and the Gypsy client 
ceased to exist”.
Pawn house loans are another, regularly used formal alternative to the poor to 
manage the gap between their income and expenditures. Since I have known Iza, 
she is a regular client of one of the nearby town’s pawnshops to pledge her gold 
necklace and earrings in emergency situations (last time she did it to buy wood so 
that she would not freeze in her shack). Many poor families keep their savings in 
gold jewellery. Not only because it gives them prestige in the local community but 
mainly as it is an asset that can easily be turned to liquid in case of pressing need. 
The third agent of the formal financial market that is available for the impoverished 
communities, is the Hungarian branch of the private bank, Evident, who is infamous 
in this region for its easily assessable, “doorstep loans”. According to scholars, one of 
the key trends behind the recent economic crisis was “the financialisation of home”, 
by which low- income groups were systematically drawn into the financial system in 
order to access basic resources such as shelter and other durable appliances (Aalbers 
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2008, cited by Palomera 2014). In this financialisation process, and by easing in 
credit and providing subprime loans, even low-income households could enter the 
financial market and accept risk into their homes that were hitherto the province of 
professionals (Martin 2002). 
The prevalence of subprime loans has a significant part in the indebtedness of the 
poor in Bánya. In Hungary, Evident is a classic example of subprime lending to the 
poor. According to financial dictionaries, a subprime loan is a loan that is offered at 
a rate above prime to individuals who do not qualify for ordinary loans (because of 
bad credit history or low and irregular income). To offset the increased risk that these 
borrowers might default, lenders charge higher rates than they offer to creditworthy 
borrowers and access additional fees. In addition, although they do not communicate 
it directly, it seems that Evident have developed a special product adjusted to the 
particular need and lifestyle of the poor: the home serviced quick loan. 
Evident, an international bank with branches in many Eastern and Western European 
countries, advertises its special loan by highlighting its easy access character. As one can 
read on its website, as to why to choose Evident, it is because the bank’s “loans are different 
from other loans as we visit you in your home. When you get a cash loan with Evident, you 
not only get money delivered to your door but a face to face service with a friendly agent…
It is this relationship which we believe sets us apart from our competitors…Why Evident? 
Because we offer flexible, weekly repayments, no hidden charges and money to your door. 
It’s a quick loan, in cash, with no need to have a bank account.” 
Iza’s former story with Evident shed light on the bank’s subprime lending practice. 
As we already read at the beginning of this paper, Iza, being in desperate need of 
accommodation for her homeless daughter Kiara, decided to ask the nurse, Evident’s 
local agent for a 150.000 forint loan to pay for the deposit for a shack to be hire 
purchased for Kiara. The nurse, whom Iza has been keeping regular weekly contact 
with, was her only hope, as nobody else, not even the informal moneylenders, would 
give her that big sum against her very low ‘income’ (child care allowance). Erzsike 
the nurse, Iza’s “saviour”, however, procured Iza’s shack and appliances (colour 
television, furniture and refrigerator) as a pledge for the loan. The nurse even took 
the loan to Iza’s house next day, for an extra 30.000 forint delivery fee. Another 
1.860 forint additional cost was added to the weekly instalments, to cover the extra 
“home service”, Evident’s speciality to the poor who feel uncomfortable doing the 
paperwork necessary for a formal loan application and who also, feel uneasy settling 
the repayment by bank transfer. (Many of them do not even have a bank account). 
All in all, Iza’s weekly repayments soared to 4.425 forint for a 68-week period. That 
is, she should have had to repay double the amount of the original loan, 300.900 
forint over a period of nearly one and a half years. This is a proper subprime loan 
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with 40.9 per cent APR 14 – out of which only a 34.5 per cent annual interest rate is 
understood by not only Iza but most of the financially uneducated debtors. 
Iza, however, was still happy to be able to seize her only chance and take the loan. 
She reasoned it to me as follows: “If you are short on money and in desperate need of 
cash, you just grab any opportunity…At that time when Kiara was in deep trouble, 
I didn’t see anything else, I couldn’t think of anything but how to get her out of it. I 
didn’t mind anything, I didn’t care for anything. I only wanted to sort it out”. 
This is the kind of thinking that is so brilliantly described in Mullainathan and 
Shafir’s (2013) excellent book on Scarcity. Those suffering from a feeling of lack of 
something (be it time for the busy; money for the poor; food for those going hungry), 
seem to have one thing in common and that is their “scarcity mind-set”. It is worth 
noting that scarcity, in the author’s concept, is not an absolute but a relative term. 
By scarcity, they mean “having less than you feel you need” (ibid: 4). This is how I 
use it in this text, too. Financial scarcity can be counterbalanced or mitigated by the 
abundance of social capital as it is often the case in poor communities held together 
by the value of reciprocity (Stack 2013). But still, scarcity changes how we think, state 
the authors. When we experience scarcity, we become absorbed by it. It captures our 
thinking and attention; and it happens unavoidably and beyond our control, invoked 
by the circumstances. Scarcity gives us a ‘tunnel vision’: we are preoccupied by what 
we lack; therefore we have less mind to give to the rest of life. 
This ‘scarcity mind-set’ is the explanation as to why Iza agreed to this predatory 
loan and soon another one, again, from the nurse (Evident) to roll over her fees to 
try to avoid insolvency and the bailiff; also, as we will soon see, why hire purchase 
companies with their misleading PR campaigns can be so successful among the poor.
“This is a rip off, only we didn’t recognise that”- Hire purchase
In a village with its tight-knit social organisation and strong dependency ties 
between patron and clients, that is, informal money lenders and their debtors, the 
arrival of new forms of creditors – the hire purchase companies, or Evident bank or 
beforehand, the local saving Cooperative – all give hope regarding decreasing local 
dependency. These formal financial institutions also provide a vehicle for the poor 
and unemployed for the acquisition of desired goods that are not basic necessities 
but partly of symbolic consumption in pursuit of achieving social worth in the eyes 
of the peer group or ‘ joy consumption’ (Collins at al. 2009), an attribute of the poor 
also in Lapos. 15 
14 The APR indicates the total cost of a loan, including its annual interest rate and all additional fees entailed. More precisely, the 
Annual Percentage Rate (Teljes Hitelmutató (THM) in Hungarian) represents the actual cost of funds over the term of a loan. 
This includes any fees or additional costs associated with the transaction; among others, the nurse's transaction fee - out of 
which she manages to pay her own debts...However, it doesn't include the home service fee.
15 The seemingly ‘irrational’, ‘joy consumption’ of the poor on ‘payday’ as it is observed in other communities (Messing – Molnár 
2011) and often raged about by better off outsiders in the media, is reasoned illuminatingly by Juli as follows: “I take it that I’d 
rather buy a chicken breast, and serve it with broccoli, once in a month, when I get the social benefit. Once the children deserve 
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Apart from the already mentioned agents of these formal lending markets, 
mobile phone companies with their hire purchase offers are also important creditors 
for the poor. However, their PR campaigns and their seemingly advantageous sale 
offers mislead the poor (along with other, better off consumers), resulting in another 
pile of hopeless debt for many of them.
The following example from Lapos sheds light on the mechanism of this sale 
technique and on how brilliantly it meets the psychology of the purchasing behaviour 
of the poor. 
One day Rozika, a mother of six girls, excitedly told me that “all the Gypsies 
(mind a cigányok) were going to Miskolc [the capital city of the region], to buy a 
Samsung phone. They give them away free! Such a good opportunity!” Miskolc is 
an hour away by train. It took Rozika another day to organise childcare but she 
wouldn’t have missed the ‘opportunity’ to get something free, especially something 
of high value. Already on that day, the first lucky buyers boasted in the village 
that they managed to resell their newly acquired phone for 70.000 forint ($230) in 
Miskolc at a retail shop. 
For the first few months most of them tried to pay the instalments of the hire 
purchase deal, but then, with many other more pressing needs such as deferred 
utility bills, fines for collecting wood from the forest, or penalties for children’s 
unauthorised absences from school, they forgot about it. Until a year later, almost 
all of them got the same official letter a week apart, warning that if they did not 
repay their 200.000 forint ($670) debt accumulated with a penalty fine, it would 
be pledged against their home or if there were any, deducted from their monthly 
income (social grant or salary from occasional public work). 
Informal money lenders have learnt a lot from their formal counterparts. There 
is a growing practice of ‘informal hire purchase’, invented by relatively better off 
residents in Bánya, themselves struggling with being short of cash, or in dire need of 
money on a dead housing market in poverty stricken settlements. The construction, 
in which Iza tried to buy the house for her daughter, was a kind of ‘informal hire 
purchase.’ On the supply side, Editke, Iza’s ‘Hungarian’ neighbour desperately 
needed money to cover the cost of funeral expenses for her deceased grandpa. On 
the demand side, Iza was desperately trying get shelter for her daughter. Demand 
and supply therefore perfectly matched. Although there was no cash in the system, 
there was trust (social collateral) already established, as Iza and Editke had known 
each other for the past five years. Iza, as we have already seen, managed to acquire 
a 150.000 forint loan from the nurse, that is from the bank, Evident. The deal 
was contracted, and the parties agreed that Iza would pay the rest of the value of 
the house (altogether it was priced at 1 million forint that is $3,300) in monthly 
to eat something good, should we always tighten [our belts] from the middle of the month”. Juli refers here to the common 
eating pattern of the poor which consists of exclusively low nutritious “poor food” (szegény kaják), mainly prepared from 
potato (guja) from the middle of each month when the tight household budget is only enough to buy cheap ingredients for 
cooking.
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instalments of 20.000 forint. According to Iza’s calculation, it was a good deal: she 
would buy it up for her daughter, during a period of three and a half years. Iza agreed 
with her daughter that they would pool their money together and repay the monthly 
redemption out of their joint budget.
This plan could even have worked if Kiara’s husband did not let Iza down by 
deciding to move his family back home. But he did, and Iza has stayed on her own 
with a growing debt of 300.000 forint ($1.000) and on top of it, the bailiff’s fee. To 
her bad luck, as she put it, she was too late to cancel her bank account – the infamous 
local bailiff had already put his hands on it, blocked it and instructed the bank to 
transfer him a third of Iza’s child care benefit, the only regular income he can have 
access to through Iza’s bank account. He already warned her that he knows of her 
property, her shack, so she had better try to redeem the debt in the next couple of 
years otherwise she would be homeless before she knew it. 
Before this incident, Iza, alongside her co-residents and friends from Bánya, 
was convinced that the nurse, Erzsike was a much nicer and bigger help than the 
informal moneylenders. Because, she stated, although “at the end of the day, you 
have to pay back the same amount [double the original loan], you are still in a more 
relaxed position as Erzsike is never impertinent or arrogant unlike the kamatosok 
[moneylenders] who can shout at you on the streets to ask you when you are going to 
bring their money back. This embarrasses me”, admits Iza, as she feels intimidated 
by their public shaming. 
However, after this latest incident with the Evident loan, that she didn’t manage 
to repay, she changed her opinion: “Now I’m telling you this [Evident] is worse than 
the kamatosok. Because there are proper legal relations here, and these official 
people can do whatever they want to do to you. You can never have rights against 
them, they are the cleverer, and the law is always on their side. A Gypsy (cigány) can 
never be right in front of the law. Meanwhile if you feel that the kamatos is not right, 
I mean too shameless [dögös], you can always report him to the police. He is illegal. 
But you can’t report a bank or the bailiffs, they are legal.” 
Informal moneylenders in Borsod say they “have learnt from Evident” how to 
bank those who are considered ‘unbankable’ by most financial institutions. As we 
will see in the following part of the paper, what these unregistered “mini bankers” 
do, is a sort of subprime lending, where the borrower has to pay the high risk of 
default and of informality/illegality.
Informal moneylending: The “fair” and the “scavenger” kamatos
The academic literature on ‘usury’ or informal moneylending has two lines of 
investigation. The first and more dominant one in Hungary interprets it in moral 
terms, calling the ‘usurers’ the “local toll-collector or exploiter of destitution,” and 
attributes the growing practice of it to the “disruption of social solidarity” and to the 
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“state of anomie” in circumstances of the “culture of poverty” (Béres – Lukács 2008: 
40, but see also Szuhay (2008) for a critique).
The second line of investigation, however, seeing it embedded in its social context, 
refers to it consequently as informal moneylending, and indicates a general logic of this 
institution (Goddard 2005; James 2012; Siyongwana 2004). On the ‘demand side’ of the 
transaction it emphasises that informal (unregistered) moneylending is an indigenous 
alternative to the formal micro financial system in many parts of the world where 
there is an unmet need for personal small loans. From the ‘supply side’ it argues that 
informal lending is a flexible, innovative response to a lack of wage or income generating 
opportunities for those in pursuit of social worth (Fotta 2015).
Drawing on my ethnographic engagement and interviews that I conducted with 
informal moneylenders, I attempt to outline here the common logic and principles 
of this institution in North Hungary. First of all, the circle of those I managed to talk 
to about their businesses clearly shows that there is no empirical grounds for the 
widespread demonising (Kaplan – Salvatore 1968) and ethnicising depiction of the 
figure of the ‘usurer’ (see also Acton 2012): one third of my interviewees was non-
Gypsy (by self-ascription which corresponded with the categorisation of other locals). 
It was also obvious from the narratives of the interviewees and according to my 
own observation that this institution has its common logic and rules. If a creditor 
breaches these rules, the local community’s borrowers can sanction him/her, as I 
explored elsewhere (Durst 2015). The strikingly common characteristics of informal 
moneylending, as has unfolded from the stories of lenders, are the following. 
Informal lending in economically disadvantaged regions such as Borsod in North 
Hungary is mainly the survival strategy of those who are formally unemployed, who 
have some entrepreneurial skill but in the absence of a formal education higher 
than primary school, cannot imagine any other investment opportunities to make 
a living for their families.16 As many of my interviewees tried to rationalise in order 
to make their practice acceptable for me, they always emphasised that they “must 
have had to start something so as to not starve the kids and to provide a better 
future for them.” They also stated that with their schooling they “didn’t have any 
other opportunities to make enough money to keep a family.” Some were proud to 
recall how poor they themselves were before they decided that they “had to start 
something with themselves.” Many of them shared their stories of how they began 
as borrowers themselves, until they had either ‘inherited’ (by the creditor’s death or 
old age) or ‘learnt’ from their lenders how to conduct this business. Their examples 
show us that the borders between debtors and creditors are blurred and permeable 
(see also Hrustic 2015 for Slovakia). 
People in this region differentiate between two types of informal lenders: the 
16 There were only four interviewees who completed vocational school, but nevertheless couldn’t find a job in the formal labour 
market as skilled labourers because of their ethnicity. There were a few others, all non-Gypsy, who pursued this business in 
their pensioner years as an extra income generating practice to make up their low pension or to support their grown up 
children.
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“fair” and the “vulturous” (rapacious) ones as borrowers refer to them. The “fair” 
moneylender is the one who keeps the appearance of solidarity, of “helping the 
poor” (Durst 2011), meanwhile the “vulturous” or “scavenger” moneylender (dögös 
kamatos)17 “only sees his own interests while amortising the borrowers,” as a debtor 
put it. While borrowers approve of what they consider “fair lending”, they condemn 
the “vulturous” one.
The ‘vulturous’ lender is the one who rolls over his borrowers debt for consecutive 
months until the whole amount is not repaid. As one of them openly spoke about 
his business, it became clear that this is the rare practice of lending money on 
compound interest – which “fair” ones never do. For a ‘vulturous lender’, a small, 
25.000 forint ($83) loan can over a six-month period yield the house of his borrower, 
to the value of 400.000 forint ($1300). Here is how he describes and perceives his 
practice: “I bought my first house for 50.000 forint. My debtor asked a 25.000 forint 
loan. The first month he should have paid back 50.000 forint to me. But he couldn’t. 
The following month this amount has doubled again to 100.000 forint. In the third 
month it was already 200.000. And the next month, I took his house for 400.000 
forint. I warned him that I would do this but he didn’t listen. He gambled his money 
away and first repaid his other debt to another lender. In the end, I rented him back 
his old house for 50.000 forint in a month. […] You ask how people think of me. They 
don’t see me as someone who does this. They see me as a decent man, as a family 
man. I suppose because I help them. […]. Yeah, sometimes I feel sorry for them, but…
no, not really. Because I was in this situation before, they did the same to my family; 
now I repay it…I can’t do anything else. One cannot make a living otherwise in this 
miserable world. But I want my children to study – I don’t want them to carry on 
with what I need to do.” 
This case is a good example of how vulturous moneylenders conduct and perceive 
their practice. Although the majority of the moneylenders are considered as “fair” 
in the studied settlements, the media reports almost exclusively on these much 
rarer scavenger practices. In the following, however, I will only explore the common 
characteristics of those who are perceived as “fair moneylenders” by the communities 
they are embedded in.18
Most borrowers see their (“fair”) creditors as a ‘mini banker’: a “businessman 
with capitalist spirit” for whom what matters most is profit and money but who also 
relies on his emotions, especially in regard to his kin. The Hungarian term kamatolás 
(as a verb) or kamatos pénz (as a noun) which people in this region use to refer to 
17 The origin of the Hungarian expression of ‘dögös’ (which I only heard from Gypsies, and which I translated here as ‘vulturous’, 
stemming from ‘carrion-vulture’) is that in earlier times the poorest Gypsies were allocated the lowest ranking jobs in rural 
Hungarian local societies: looking after the well where carrion was stored. According to the collective memories in Lapos, in 
times of emergencies, Gypsies fed on carrion, giving reason for the ‘ethnic Hungarians’ (non-Gypsies) to call Gypsies ‘dögös’ or 
‘carrion-eater’ when they wanted to express hatred towards them. This ‘Gypsy job’ was considered the most disdained work 
by non-Gypsy Hungarians.
18 One limitation of this research was that it was naturally much easier to approach "fair" informal lenders than the "vulturous" 
ones, therefore there is much more emphasis in this paper on the  former ones' practices.
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‘usurious’ lending can be best translated into English as ‘doing interest’ or ‘money 
of interest.’ How to ‘fairly’ do interest, has its own principles. A ‘fair lender’ tries to 
help his kin by lending money on either no or smaller interest rates than to non-
relatives. He is also a man blessed with ingenuity, ‘cleverness’ (gógyi)19 and a good 
sense of business. He very rarely has conflicts with his debtors; they repay their debt 
to him since they know that they will need his ‘help’ even by the next month. He is 
the last resort for them to hold (cling) onto. Therefore, says the local wisdom here, 
“moneylenders always were and always will be there until the poor need them.”
The fair creditor is community-minded: he carefully and flexibly calculates the 
cap of the interest rate and the duration of repayment on his loan, depending on 
seasonal and other conditional circumstances of his debtors’ solvency. For example, 
in festive seasons, especially during Christmas time most ‘fair’ lenders say they “look 
after” their chaps (kuncsaft as they call their clients) by “not let their families starve,” 
which means, in practical terms that they let them borrow above their means by 
providing them with four to five kilograms of meat on credit from their pig-killing. 
Apart from these special times, during the year, informal lenders, brilliant mental 
mathematicians themselves, emphasise the importance of knowing by heart their 
debtors’ financial (and personal) circumstances to secure their payments and keep 
their business going. Marika, who learnt this business from and started it with the 
help of her cousin, another “fair” moneylender of her village, tells us a typical case of 
her practice: “We are happy if our chaps repay what they owe us…I must know exactly 
their monthly incomings. Take an example: I know that one of my regular chaps has 
six kids, so the family gets eighty thousand [forint] of childcare benefit. And then 
they have their twenty two thousand of social benefit. So I give this family the whole 
amount of their childcare benefit: fifty thousand loans, on which they have to give 
back eighty thousand for me. Little by little. Next month he comes to me again, if he 
gives me back the whole amount, the fifty thousand. [Which covers only the loaned 
capital but not the interest!]. And then it starts again from the beginning”. 
The informal lending market consists of many small networks. Each creditor 
(in a similar role as peasant- patrons used to provide their informal day labourers) 
‘looks after’ as many put it, a client circle of six to eight families. In a small town 
such as Bánya with its fifteen hundred dwellers, the market is shared by ten to 
twelve informal lenders. “Blacklisted” borrowers (those who did not repay their debt 
to their lender) are mostly banned by other informal creditors, many of who can 
form an alliance in case of trouble (non-payment). “It takes me only a phone call and 
ten of my friends come in fifteen minutes to help me collect my debt. We have our 
circle. We help each other out if one of us needs it. We lend money to each other but 
without interest. “This is a brotherhood,” as one of the Roma men puts it. Here the 
19 The Hungarian word ‘gógyi’ that Gypsy communities frequently use, can be translated as ‘streetwise’ – it is a kind of ’cleverness’ 
that you cannot learn in school but only from lived experiences or as (Pulay 2015) puts it, from the “school of life.” (See also 
Nótár 2014).
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ethnic belonging matters only in the sense that it gives the group members an extra 
capital, which can be called ethnic capital, based on bounded solidarity (Portes 2010) 
or bounded trust, inside the group. “Yeah, we are all Roma in this friend circle, which 
I called brotherhood. A Roma trusts another Roma more than a Hungarian (non-
Roma). You never know with a Hungarian, he might report you [to the police]” (see 
also Deans (2004) on the issue of trust in Roma communities). 
Another common principle of this institution is that an informal loan is a 
“payday” credit- whether one borrows it a day or two or twenty-two days before he 
gets paid, he has to repay it with the same agreed upon interest. 20 The interest rate 
moves around a wide scale from thirty per cent through fifty or seventy to a hundred 
per cent, depending on the competitors of the market and the solvency of the clients. 
But many ‘fair’ lenders make do with a fifty per cent interest rate these days as the 
competition gets tougher and as people get even more impoverished then they used 
to be a few years ago: “You have to think carefully whom you take as your chap. This 
is the most difficult bit in this business – to find your reliable regular clients. It is 
all about whom you trust. And once you get them, you have to carefully calculate 
your interest rate – in this impoverished neighbourhood you can’t just give double 
the money [with 100 per cent interest rate] because then they won’t be able to repay 
it to you. And you will go bankrupt.” This is how Marika illuminated the common 
rational thinking of the informal lenders. 
Given regular client circles, informal lending is a regular monthly income-
generating activity. Most of my interviewees have a turnover capital of 200.000 - 
300.000 forint ($670 - $1000) a month, out of which they can make a profit (earn 
a liquid monthly income) of 100.000 - 200.000 forint ($335 - $670), depending on 
the interest rates they employ. Many of the debtors can only repay the interest, and 
sometimes a part of the capital. So the next month they have to pay interest on 
the value of the remainder capital together with the amount of the new loan (see 
Table 1). Informal lenders can secure their regular income by keeping their regular 
clientele being indebted to them. Most of their clients take their monthly loans at 
the average sum of 40.000 - 60.000 forint ($133 - $200) in small instalments: in five 
to ten thousand forints ($17 - $34) per transaction, during the whole month. They 
mainly ask for credit for handling unexpected crises: a child’s illness, medicines, 
paying for a fine or a funeral.
20 Once Chita had to ask for a 50.000 forint loan from a ‘good lady’, as she said to me, which “helped her out” for two days 
(as Chita’s informal employer could pay her a week later as she was promised) when her two year old child got seriously ill 
with a rare viral infection and she wanted to stay with her in the hospital. In this region it is common experience for Gypsies 
to be treated like ‘second rate citizens’ (Szalai 2002), or “like horses” as Chita usually puts it, so she wanted to take a “paid” 
paediatrician in the hospital, for 10.000 forint, and was ready to pay another 5.000 forint per day for the room to stay with her 
little child. She not only needed to pay her cousin 5.000 forint (for fuel) to take her with the child to the nearest hospital 20 km 
away, but she also needed to buy toiletries and a night-dress (as many of the poor do not have any) to be able to stay in the 
hospital. She had to pay the high price for this “help” later though: when she got her late payment for her occasional work, she 
had to give it almost all away to repay double the informal loan for the ‘good lady.’ But she reasoned it as follows:” you can’t 
think when your child is ill. You just grab whatever you can; you just turn to whoever will help you out of your misery”. Here 
again is another example of how “scarcity mind-set” (Mullainathan – Shafir 2013) works.
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Table 1 Rozika’s loan portfolio with Robika, her informal lender
Period Loan (claimed)
Interest 
(on the loan), 
with 30 per cent rate 
Amount of debt Repayment
1st month 20.000 forint 6.000 forint 26.000 forint 6.000 forint 
2nd month 20.000 forint 12.000 forint 52.000 forint 12.000 forint
3rd month 60.000 forint 18.000 forint 140.000 forint* 18.000 forint
* The lending story finishes as follows: Rozika, who had to ask for a bigger loan in the third month to bury her Papa (grandpa), 
after she wasn’t even able to redeem the capital of the loan she had asked for in the first two months, received debt relief from 
her “good-hearted” creditor as she recalls: Robika relieved her from paying the interest. She only had to repay the loan in the 
amount of 140.000 forint but again she was allowed to do it in 10.000 forint monthly instalments…This was the only way for 
Robika to collect his money. 
One more common characteristic of informal moneylending is that in many cases 
this is only one element of a complex strategy for making a living. Many of the 
creditors are engaged in other businesses such as the informal selling of clothes 
and foods (see Béres on food usury 2015) that they distribute on credit among 
their clientele for double the prime cost. Another common feature of the lenders 
is that the majority of them use their earnings as a vehicle (the only one that they 
perceive to be available for them) to enhance social mobility: to buy a house or move 
into a better (less segregated) neighbourhood and to provide further education for 
their children. In pursuit of their desire for social mobility, many of them started 
their lending business by taking up a bank loan from Evident or investing their 
savings from having worked abroad into this new enterprise. A few recall a similar 
story of coming home from Canada: as early as the following morning, neighbours 
knocked on their doors to ask for money on interest. Almost all the narratives find 
it important to emphasise that it was the clients who asked for the money, not the 
lenders offered it. 
Last but not least, informal moneylending is not a gendered work but a petty 
family business. Many small-scale lenders conduct their financial activities with 
the help of close family members: in the case of a man, it is his wife. Despite the 
stereotypical representations of the media, and also, of ethnographic findings from 
Gypsy communities in other parts of the world (Fotta 2015), here in Borsod, women 
are equally important agents of informal moneylending. Although the tattooed, 
muscle-laden men are almost always in the background to demonstrate physical 
power (which is sometimes needed to secure repayment), it is the women who 
manage the operative tasks of the business. They ‘keep the book’ (which is in most 
cases a cheap school notebook), registering the (nick) names of their clients, and the 
sum they borrowed with the due deadline.
Also, in general, women are the ones who collect the repayments, either by 
standing in front of the local pay point on paydays, or ‘calling off’ debtors in public 
spaces. ‘Fair’ lenders attribute the important role of women in the business to their 
respect in the Gypsy communities and their having less vulnerability with the 
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police. “A woman [unlike a man] has patience. She can keep the book and she can 
stand in front of the pay point for hours. She has greater respect, especially among 
the Gypsies. And it is also different if a woman fights. She is not in as much trouble 
as a man [would be in the same situation]. A policeman takes a woman less likely 
than [he takes] a man”. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning the ambivalent feelings that surround informal 
creditors (see also James 2014). Although borrowers see their lender as their helper, 
they also see that they make their profit out of the need of their destitution. As 
Rozika wondered one day, she didn’t understand “how Robika can sleep when he 
takes the bread out of the children’s mouths…But I think God will repay him double; 
this cannot be an accident that his grandchild was born ill…” 
Summarising our ethnographic findings, we can conclude that informal 
moneylenders are innovators in a sense that they have appropriated the loaning 
practice of formal banks. If we compare their lending practice with those of Evident, 
to our amusement, we can find many similarities. First of all, both of them have 
developed a product designed for the needs of the poor who are not taken as credit-
worthy by most of the financial institutions. Given the lack of the usually expected 
physical collaterals (the borrower’s house or other durable assets, and his/her regular 
wage), they pledge their loans on social grants (childcare allowance and benefits) and 
on social collateral (Karlan et al. 2009) – a kind of network based trust which both 
informal lenders and Evident’s local contractors effectively use to minimise risk 
and secure repayments. Also, both informal lenders and Evident provide a special, 
‘door to door’ service for their clients most of whom feel uncomfortable dealing 
with paperwork and the bank transfers needed for most formal loan applications. 
At the end of the day, the price of this special service and the high risk involved in 
loaning low-income households has to be paid by a subprime interest rate or APR (on 
average 50 percent). Informal lenders also use social collateral (complemented by 
financial ones) when they lend to first time borrowers from another settlement that 
are unknown to them. In this case a ‘common friend,’ an old client of the creditor 
who is at the same time an acquaintance of the new borrower needs to recommend 
the new client and should stand as guarantor for him; that is, in case of a default of 
payment, the guarantor has to secure it. This practice is also very similar to the one 
that financial institutions such as the local Cooperative employ. 
Concluding remarks
The last twenty years of the post-transitional period after the collapse of state 
socialism in Hungary has produced a peculiar kind of flexible and petite capitalism 
in economically disadvantaged regions with a high rate of formal unemployment and 
income poverty. One of the lessons of this small scale anthropological study is that in 
rural Northern Hungary, in common with some other transitional societies, the often 
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contradictory forces of state and market have intertwined to create a redistributive 
neoliberalism (James 2014) and contributed to reshape old dependency ties and 
reconfigure them into a historically embedded patronage-clientele relationship with 
emerging new patrons. In this petite capitalism, people at all levels attempt to make 
money from the destitution of the cash-poor. There is not much difference between 
the logic behind the lending practices of the formal financial institutions (Evident, 
the local saving Cooperative, the mobile phone companies and the pawn houses) 
and that of their informal equivalents: the moneylenders. In this economically 
depressed region of the country, a whole industry has been built around the needs 
of and the cash-deprivation of the poor. This moneymaking (formal and informal/
illegal) financial industry can only stay profitable as James (2014) emphasises, if it 
manages to access the money – however small the amount – from the widest possible 
range of people, amongst others, of the poor who are strongly overrepresented in the 
studied settlements. 
If we try to rethink the economy in the way suggested by Narotzky and Besnier 
(2014) to “centre our attention to the complex ways in which people attempt to make 
life worth living for themselves and for their future generations, involving not only 
waged labour but also investment in social relations and …a multitude of other 
forms of social action” (ibid: S4), then we will be attentive to the busy economic life 
of the formally unemployed but informally working poor.  
As we have seen in the studied communities, many of the formally unemployed 
people try to make money from something. A great many of them trade constantly 
(see also Deans 2004), and informally and with all possible goods and services from 
food and tobacco to electricity; through giving lifts to villagers to the hospital or to 
the shop; to lending money by aping the practices of formal banks. 
The problem with these constantly fluid practices of informal trading-lending 
is that it is a zero sum game: few win at the cost of the loss of many. With the 
commodification and financialisation of the world, even in the poorest shanty-
villages, local social organisations are reconfigured, new hierarchies are constituted, 
and dependency ties are re-formed, along the lines of old ones. During this process, 
new agents have emerged to dominate the social space which was occupied earlier 
by old-type patrons: better-off farmers (non-Roma, ‘ethnic Hungarians’), providing 
casual labour and other material and symbolic support to their clients. The newly 
emerged patrons, however, are not in a position to provide work anymore with a 
rural economy constantly in recession unless the state helps them with allocating 
resources for public employment. One of the most powerful of the new patrons is the 
local petty monarchs: the mayors of the villages. In many shanty-villages like Lapos, 
that are left alone by the state to deal with their poverty and that were deregulated 
and put under the uncontrolled power of the local government, the mayors works 
in close alliance with the chief informal money lender to centralise all power into 
their hands (Durst 2015). What they can provide, in the face of a lack of proper 
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(productive) work, is public employment and credit - in a symbolic, and in a material 
sense. The mayor designates public work (a substitute of social benefit but with a 
much higher income) to those villagers whom he judges as “deserving poor.” The 
public work, for many is a hope (a credit by which they are buying in their future) 
that they can make a better living. But this hope soon evaporates as they come to 
realise that for many, half of their monthly income from the public work is regularly 
withheld for their long forgotten debt (towards utility companies, banks, or other 
state institutions, whom, in the last few years, charged hundreds of thousands 
forints as penalty interest on their unpaid debts). These lenders have now, with the 
advent of the state policy of supporting the unemployed by creating ‘work’ for them - 
public work which was supposed to but never managed to help the jobless reintegrate 
into the formal labour market-; these lenders, at last, got into a position to get what 
they were owed by their debtors.
Although the anthropological literature emphasises that debt has different 
meanings, and that there can be “good debt”: “those that release, liberate and enrich” 
(Guerin 2014), in rural northern Hungary the poor’s debt is a bad debt. On the one 
hand, it yields profit to some formal financial institutions. It also serves well to a 
very few informal moneylenders who use this informal economic practice, due to the 
lack of other available formal ones, for their family’s social mobility. On the other 
hand, however, to the vast majority of the poor this surmounting bad debt only 
contributes to their subjugation, further impoverishment, and in extreme cases, to 
new enslavement.
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